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Chapter pages in book: (p. 8 - 32)be calculated only roughly, by assuming that it bore the same ratio
1941 as trade unions' idleness. Because of the weakness of the 1939 esti-
mate of labor force, the crudeness of the annual interpolations and the
lack of age and sex detail during 1942-44, most of the wartime analyses
are confined to comparisons of June 1945 with June 1941
Thelabor force data of Germany are from the official census of 1939
and from the Kriegswirtschaftliche Kräftebilanz (War Economy Man-
power Balance Sheet) of the Statistisches Reichsamt for 1940-44. The
latter "were not always reliable and had frequently changing conceptual
and territorial coverage.", were based on questionnaires to be returned
by employees, self-employed professional workers, and the like, on the
membership lists of industrial, trade, and cultural organizations, and
were subject to some gaps and duplications among organizations. The
data were used in the study as adjusted for the above discrepancies by
the Strategic Bombing Survey. They cover all gainfully occupied persons
counting, beginning 1944, a small number of home workers, i.e., per-
Sons engaged in industrial work at home.8
3THE LABOR FORCE IN MOBILIZATION:. UNITED STATES, GREAT
BRITAIN, GERMANY
It is convenient to divide the half dozen years of .war into three 2-year
periods: the first ending with Germany's 'attack on Russia, the second
with its surrender in North 'Africa, the third with its defeat in Europe.
The last few months of World War II get incidental attention, for
Japan's surrender was an anticlimax to the German collapse. This sec-
tion describes in some detail the assembling of labor resources by the
three major countries and carries a statistical account for Canada in
Charts 1, 7, and Tables 1, 2, 5-8.
Canada: Canada Yearbook, 1945 and 1947; Census of Canada, 1941, VII, Occu-
pations, 12; Canadian Statistical Review; Labour Force Bulletin; Department of
Labour, Ottawa: Labour Force Gazette, Estimates of the Canadian Labour Force
anditsComposition, 1941-47 (mimeographed).
Germany: Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das.Deutsche Reich, 1938; Wirtschaft und
Statistik, Feb. 1941, p.' 50, Dcc. 1940, p. 519; Effects of Strategic Bombing on the
German War Economy, U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Overall Economic Effects
Division, Oct. 31, 1945), Appendix Tables 1, 6, pp. 199, 202, 207; Statistical Year-
book of the League of Nations, 1941-42 (Geneva, 1943), Table 3, p. 26; Frank Note-
stein, Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union (Geneva, 1944), pp. 264-5..
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Labor Force, Armed Forces, and Unemployed
AUnited States, 1940—1951, Quarterly Averages*
of persons
MID-1939 TO THE INVASION OF RUSSIA
During April 1939-41 the United States drafted a million men and took
4.5 million into civilian employment besides. About six in ten of the in-
crease came from reduction in unemployment and the rest from a rise
9
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sources of data and some discussion of their nature, see Section 2; notes-8, 42.
* Population changes eUminoted from labor force; both labor force and unemployed
for seasonal variation.Chart1 (cant..)
Labor Force, Armed Forces, and Unemployed
BGreat Brttain, 1939—1948*
Armed Forces and Unemployed Quarterly Beg(nning Mtd-1945
MiliLong of persons
5.5
in the labor force. The only industry that did not gain workers was agri-
culture, which gave up almost half a million (Chart 2). Acquisitions
were least, under a tenth, in trade, distribution, and finance, public
utilities, mining, and services; most in transportation (a ninth), manu-
facturing (a fourth), and contract construction (nearly two-thirds).
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* Population chan9es eliminated from labor force.Chart I (cont.)
Labor Force, Armed Forces, and Unemployed








Combined trade, distribution, and finance reached a peak during 1941.
A pinch of skilled craftsmen, felt particularly in the metal trades, was
relieved by upgrading workers and breaking down complex jobs and
training persons to do semiskilled suboperations. Location of defense
demands in areas of short supply stimulated tremendous migration. In






* Populationchanges eliminatedfrom labor force; 1945 both labor force and unemployed
adjusted for seasonalvariation.Chart1 (concl.)







machine tools, components, ships, freight cars, and (in defense areas)
housing andpublicfacilities.9
Historical Reports on War Administration, No. 1: The United States at War
(Development and Administration of the War. Program by the Federal Govern-
ment), prepared under the auspices of the Committee of Records of War Adminis-















































Armed forces; no deductLon for losses
(killed, prisoners, or missing)
Labor force* (excess over 1939
including foreigners; excluding losses)
Actual
Native labor force, deficit compared
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Population changes eliminated from the laborforce.Britain's economy in this time of its defiance was under intense strain
but did not suffer from general labor scarcity until July 1941.'°Limiting
factors throughout 1940 were skilled workmen, especially in aero engine
and ordnance factories, and in industrial facilities: steel, alloy steel,
machine tools, fabricated items. These bottlenecks kept a famine of un-
skilled and semiskilled labor from manifesting itself until nearly two
years after the start of the war.
Over 3 million men and women went into its armed forces. Only a
few were at the expense of civilian employment, for possibly two-thirds
came from reemployment and shifts out of non-industrial areas, the
other million from a 4 percent net increase in the proportion of popula-
tion in the labor force, about haff of labor force accretions for the war.
Employment declined in most industries, particularly those in which pay-
roll accessions in the United States were moderate —commerce,dis-
tribution? and banking —andpublic utilities, miscellaneous services,
and mining (not charted separately). Some industries that gained a lot
in this country lost a lot in Britain, notably construction (not charted
separately). On the other hand, agriculture, which gave up workers
here, took on a few in Britain during this period and continued to do so
for the duration. Increases were concentrated in fewer industries: engi-
neering, vehicles, and shipbuilding and government (not charted sep-
arately) each expanded employment about a third.
The heavy emphasis on defense production called for mass shifts of
workers to new industries. In these transfers compulsion played a, role
not to be entirely ignored. During those first years, however, it "was pro-
ceeding but slowly. Its influence in the big migration into war industry
between mid-1940 and mid-1941 must not therefore be overestimated
•.industrialconscription was operating as yet only on the difficult
margins of the war economy." In the sense that workers had rather
10Historyof the Second World War, United Kingdom Series: British War Economy,
ed. by W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London,
1949),pp. 291-2.
'1lbid., p. 309. "The award of government contracts, fortified by grants of priority
for materials and labour, was perhaps the most important of all the forces that were
building up munitions employment. For many workers, perhaps for the majority,
transfer from civilian industry to war industry did not mean either a change of neigh-
borhood or of factory or of occupation; it was the factory itself that was switched
over.... Thechange was frequently a matter of the product, rather than of the
processes upon which labour was engaged. Workers did also, of course, change their
jobs, their factories and their neighborhoods. A variety of 'pulls' and 'pushes' moved
them. Patriotism drew many into war work, the desire to shelter from the Forces
drew a few. Higher wages ... wereoften a powerful incentive. Meanwhile, the
decline of the unessential industries exerted a steady 'push'."
13Chart 2
CivilianEmploymentby Industrial Divisions, World War II
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14Mifiton, United States (annual average)
SourcesUnited States, (cO,7017ilc 1950.
p. 162.
Great8rLtaIn, Abstract oF Statistics,
No.86,1938-1948,97,
Germany, Strategic Bombing Survey,
pp. 204-5.
wide choice of time and place, their movement must for the most part be
regarded as voluntary.
Germany, as a result of its victories, did not experience real manpower
stringency during this biennium. The use of steel output to sustain cur-
rent consumption rather than to expand facilities, the enormous capac-
ity in conquered and intimidated countries, and the herds of foreign
replacements imparted a sense of strength that could not have made it
easy to call on civilians for sacrifices. Focusing of production in the most
efficient plants to save fuel, labor, and transportation was opposed by
management and minor party leaders (as in the United States and, for
a time, in Britain). In 1940 it was urged that women be conscripted and
the workweek lengthened in order to replace drafted labor. But vir-
tually nothing of this sort was done; instead, more emphasis was laid
15
Chart 2 (concl.)
Civilian Employment by Industrial Divisions, World War II
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1939'40'41'42'43'44'45upon recruiting non-Germans. The easy going administration of the war,
especially in the first years, was reflected in. the mere 4 percent rise of out-
put up to 1941.
Indeed, Germans were not drawn into the work force even as fast as
they increased among the working age population, and the civilian labor
force was not replenished for any citizens called to its armed forces. 'In-
dustry' (manufacturing, mining, and construction), despite reinforce-
ment by nearly1million aliens, parted with almost that number.
Employment decreases were particularly severe, about a fourth, in hand
work and in combined trade, banking, and insurance. A net half a mil-
lion left agriculture despite reinforcement by three times as many for-
eigners. Clearly wdmen did not go into work in sufficient number to
make up for men drawn into the army, navy, and air force. Females
Table 1
Labor Force by Employment and Military Status: Four Countries
Both Sexes 14 and Older (millions of persons)
A UNITED STATES, APRIL 1940-1945
1940 1941 1942 1943 19441945
Totallabor force (civilian &
military) • 54.8 56.3 58.8 63.2 65.2 66.3
Armed forces 0.3 1.3 2.9 8.3 10.9 12.1
Labor force (civilian) 54.5 55.0 55.9 54.9 54.3 54.2
Unemployed 8.4 6.4 3.1 1.0 0.7 0.5
Employed 46.1 48.6 52.8 53.9 53.6 53.7
Labor force increase over 1940 1.5 4.0 8.4 10.4 11.5
Due to population growth 0.7 1.3 1.9 2.5 3.0
Excess over part due to
population growth 0.8 2.7 6.5 7.9 8.5
Unemployment compared with
1940 —2.0 —5.3 —7.4 —7.7 —7.9
Employment increase over 1940
Civilian 2.5 6.7 7.8 7.5 7.6
Total (civilian & military) 3.5 9.3 15.8 18.1 19.4
BGREAT BRITAIN, JUNE 1939-1945 1939 1943 1945
Totallabor force (civilian & military.) 22.9 25.2 24.6
Armed forces 0.5 4.8 5.1
Labor force (civilian) . 22.4 20.4 19.5
Unemployed 1.2 .0.0 0.1
Employed 21.2 20.4 19.4
Labor force increase over 1939 2.3 1.7
Due to population growth 0.5 0.6
Excess over part due to population growth 1.8 1.1
Unemployment compared with 1939 —1.2 —1.1
Employment increase over 1939
Civilian —0.8 —1.8
Total (civilian & military) . 3.5 2.8
16CCANADA, Auo. 1939,JUNE1941-45
1939 1941 1942 1943 19441945
Totallabor force (civilian &
military) 4.4 4.7 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.3
Armed forces 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.7
Labor force (civilian) 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.6
Unemployed 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Employed 3.7 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5
Labor force increase over 1939 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9
Due to population growth 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4
Excess over part due to
population growth 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5
Unemployment compared with
1939 —0.4 —0.5 —0.6 —0.6 —0.6
Employment increase over 1939
Civilian 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8
Total (civilian & military) 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5
D GERMANY, MAY 1939-1944
1939 1940 1941 1942 19431944
NATIVESMOBILIZED (MILITARY NOT
DEDUCTED)' Total labor force (civilian &
military) 40.5 40.5 40.5 40.7 41.5 41.4
Armed forces mobilized 1.4 5.7 7.4 9.4 11.2 12.4
Labor force (civilian) 39.1 34.8 33.1 31.3 30.3 29.0
Unemployedb 0.2 0.1
Employed 38.9 34.7 33.1 31.3 30.3 29.0
Labor force increase over 1939 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.9
Tncrease called for by
population growth 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.3
Deficit below increase called
for by population growth —0.3 —0.6 —0.6 —0.1 —0.4
Unemployment compared with
1939 —0.1 —0.2
Employment increase over 1939
Civilian —4.2 —5.8 —7.6 —8.6 —9.9
Total (civilian & military) 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.2 1.1
NATIVES AND FOREIGNERS (MILITARY LOSSES
Total labor force (civilian &
DEDUCTED)
military) 40.8 41.6 43.4 44.2 46.1 45.2
Armed forces active 1.4 5.6 7.2 8.7 9.6 9.1
Labor force (civilian) 39.4 36.0 •36.2 35.5 36.5 36.1
Labor force increase over 1939 0.8 2.6 3.4 5.3 4.4
Due to population growth 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.3
Excess over part due to
population growth 0.5 2.0 2.6 4.2 3.1
For sources of data and some discussion of their nature and adjustment, see text
Section 2; notes 1-8, 42.
'The purpose in not deducting military losses is to show the labor force contributed
by the German population. The number actually available for work or military ser-
vice was, of course, smaller by the number of war dead or missing, which were (in
thousands) 1939, 0; 1940, 85; 1941, 185; 1942, 800; 1943, 1,680; 1944, 3,285.
bUnemploymentwas assumed to be negligible after 1940.
17employed on family farms as parttime 'helping members' had always
•been supposed to constitute a hidden reserve that could shift to industry
•without taking much away from agriculture, but no more than a few
hundred thousand were, in fact, released. Little help came from in-
creases in hours. The average workweek was lengthened only 4 percent
from March 1939 to its.high for the war, 49.5 hours in September 1941.
As an interesting commentary on the Nazi myth of total warfare, do-
mestic service, almost entirely native German, relinquished relatively
few in this or subsequent periods.'2
TO THE TRIUMPH IN NORTH AFRICA
A general labor deficit did not appear in the United States between
April .1941 and More moved into its labor force than in any
other period —nearly7 million. This matched the rise in armed
forces, so that civilian employment could profit by the entire 5 million
decline in unemployment (Tables 1 and 2). Gains of a tenth were
registered in services and transportation, and of a fourth in manufac-
turing. But mining, public utility, and agricultural employments barely
Strategic Bombing Survey, pp. 2 1-33, 35, 215.
la TheUnited States at War, p. 173. "Officials concerned with manpower [in, say,
1942] were shadow-boxing with a problem which had not yet developed. There was
a great output of plans and much controversy over what should be done and who
should do it, but few actions of any importance were taken. Yet this lack of action
did not appreciably retard war production. Workers continued to show up at the
factories, employers continued to hire and train them, and Government for the most
part observed the process from the sidelines."
Table 2
Additions to Employment and Labor Force by Sources
Both Sexes 14 and Older (all data except percentages in millions of persons)
A UNITED STATES, APRIL 1940-1945
1940-41 1941-42 1942-43 1943-44 1944-45 1940-45
I Employment (civilian &
military) rise 3.5 5.8 6.5 2.3 1.3 19.4
2 Unemployment fall 2.0 3.3 2.1 0.3 0.2 7.9
3 Labor force rise 1.5 2.5 4.4 2.0 1.1 11.5
4Due to population growth0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 3.0
5Excess over part due to
population growth 0.8 1.9 3.8 1.4 0.6 8.5
6 Taken into armed forces 1.0 1.6 5.4 2.6 1.2 11.8
7 Civilian employment rise 2.5 4.2 1.1 —0.3 0.1 7.6
8 Labor force rise as % of ad-
ditions to armed forces
(line 5 ÷ 6) 80 119 70 54 50 72
18BGREAT BRITAIN, JUNE 1939-1945 1939-431943-451939-45


































1 Employment (civilian & military) rise
2 Unemployment fall
3 Labor force rise
4Due to population growth
5Excess over part due to population growth
6 Taken into armed forces
7 Civilian employment rise
8 Labor force rise as % of additions to armed forces
(line 5 ± 6)
CCANADA, Auo. 1939, JUNE 1941-45
1939-41 1941-42 1942-43
1 Employment (civilian &
military) rise 0.7 0.4 0.2
2 Unemployment fall 0.4 0.1 0.1
3 Labor force rise 0.3 0.3 0.1
4Due to population growth0.1 0.1 0.0
5Excess over part due to
population growth 0.2 0.2 0.1
6 Taken into armed forces 0.3 0.2 0.2
7 Civilian employment rise 0.4 0.2 0.0
8 Labor force rise as %ofad-
ditions to armed forces
67 100 50
D GERMANY, MAY 1939-1944
1 Employment (civilian &
military) rise
2 Unemployment fall'
3 Labor force rise
4Due to population growth
5Excess over part due to
population growth
6 Taken into armed forces
7 Civilian employment rise
8 Labor force rise as % of ad-
ditions to armed forces
(line 5 ± 6)
1 Labor force rise
2Due to population growth
3Excess over part due to
population growth
4 Added to armed forces
5 Labor force rise as % of ad-
ditions to armed forces
(line 3 ÷4)
For sources of data and some discussion of their nature andadjustmentseeSection
2; notes 1-8, 42.







































—18 —o 28 —25 —4
NATIVES AND FOREIGNERS (MILITARY LOSSES
DEDUCTED)
0.8 1.8 0.8 1.9 —0.9 4.4
0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.3
0.5 1.5 0.6 1.6 —1.1 3.1
4.2 1.6 1.5 0.9 —0.5 7.7
12 94 40 178 220 40held their own (agriculture despite wholesale deferment). Trade, dis-
tribution, and finance parted with a small percentage. Construction
dwindled almost to 1939 levels. Some industries had their top employ-
ments in the middle of this biennium.
As the conflict passed through different stages, British workers shifted
out of nonessential into higher priority areas. Main expansions up to
mid-1943 took place in the armed forces, agriculture, government, and
the manufacture of metals, vehicles, ships, and chemicals. Losses con-
tinued to be suffered in food, clothing, and shoe manufacturing, utilities,
construction, commerce, distribution, and other services. Transportation
and mining employment held their own. Altogether, Britain made the
remainder of its labor force increments, about a million, and apparently
attained its peak mobilization at the close of this period.
Nevertheless a. gap opened between labor needs and supply two years
before there was even a moderate divergence in the United States (see
below). Failure to fill requirements began in Birmingham and Sheffield
areas and led quickly to the manpower survey of mid-1941, the first step
in allocating supply where it was most needed. This survey forecast large
new demands for 1942. Partly as a result, Britain passed its National
Service Act just before Japan's attack on Hawaii, extending obligation
of defense work to all persons 18 and 60, raising the age for. military
service from 41 to' 50, and applying conscription to women 20-30,
with option to enter Auxiliary Service, civil defense, or essential industry.
By Pearl Harbor day, shortages had intensified, become acute in coal
mining, shipbuilding, aircraft production, and armed services. Plans to
relieve them with labor from construction, which had been due to shrink,
were shelved by the need to build camps and airfields for American
forces, scheduled to begin disembarking in 1942. A second manpower
budget, drawn up in, mid-1942 for the next 18 months, indicated addi-
tional demand for 2.7 million workers and extra supply of only 1.6 mu-
lion. To cut demand and allocate output to, industries with the most
urgent requirements, Supply Ministries were told to economize on labor
or curtail contracts. "Manpower had become an almost continuous pre-
occupation of the War
Britain even turned to women with household responsibilities. The
manpower authority interviewed them during late 1941 and early 1942
and, when they ha4 free time, asked them to take parttime work, em-
British War Economy, pp. 313,438-49.
20phasizing inducement rather than compulsion. Britain exempted workers
doing. 30 hours or less per week from Unemployment Insurance Acts
and Essential Work Orders in order to relieve them from insurance de-
ductions and from fear that they could not withdraw if the burden of
working both in and out of the home became too heavy. Parttime em-
ployment grew three quarters of a million.15 "The extent of the mobil-
ization was considerably greater than was achieved during the first world
war....Womenwere brought directly into the war effort to a far
greater extent .. ."(ibid.,pp. 3-4).
NUMBER OP PARTTIME WORKERS IN BRITISH EMPLOYMENT
UNADJUSTED FOR LENGTH OF TIME WORKED
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
June June June December June December June
Negligible380,000 750,000840,000 900,000870,000 900,000
In autumn 1941 Hitler ordered a production cutback in the belief that
victory was in sight, but rescinded 'it after the Moscow defeat in early
1942. Instead of taking effective measures to recruit nationals, however,
Germany stepped up immigration. Its attempt to draw in women
through the registration of January 1943 had negligible results. The
labor force reached its maximum with a million workers arid fighters
more than in 1939. As this increase was under that which could have
come through population growth, its native labor force remained below
the proportion of working age populationthat had prevailed in 1939. It
was a small amount below that level even before battle deaths are de-
ducted, and when these are taken out, nearly2 milli6n. Another 3 mil-
lion aliens were drawn into work, but civilian employment climbed only
a few hundred thousand —tothe highest it was to achieve. Minor gains
were realized in agriculture, transportation, and industry, major ones in
armed forces administration. In May 1943 employment in agriculture
and industry counting foreigners, was at about 1939 levels. But extensive
use of Poles, French, Belgians, Dutch, and other nationals could not
vent employment from falling a tenth in trade, banking, and insurance,
or in administration and services, and a sixth in handwork. Hours
worked by the average wage earner went back to prewar levels, as the
workweek of females steadily shortened through the war.'6 Even domes-
tic help fell off a bit!
'5Ministry of Labour and National Service Report, 1939-46, p. 65. Counting two
parttime workers as one fulitime, following the British, yields 190,000 for June 1942,
375,000 for June 1943, and so on.
'5StrategicBombing Survey, pp. 35,215.
21
ITO THE VICTORY IN EUROPE
During the last two years of war the labor forces of the three countries
did not change much. The United States gained 3.1 million new workers
and its total labor force grew almost up to V-E Day but since nearly 4
million men were taken by the armed forces civilian employment arrived
at its maximum in 1943. Munitions employment aiso got to its summit
in the last months of that year.17 Transportation continued to add to pay-
rolls; and services, trade, distribution, and finance recovered slightly.
All other industries, particularly manufacturing, mining, construction,
and agriculture, yielded up workers. Employment declined even in
government.
Labor, not theretofore critically short, became in autumn 1943 an
'ultimate' limit on production; on the Pacific Coast female workers were
scarce in all industries. As the drafts to the services outpaced inflows
to the labor force and reductions in unemployment, civilian employment
fell behind for the first time, dropping over a million in 1944 (Table 2).
"The labor reserves with which the United States had entered the war
had been.fully mobilized. .. everybodywho would willingly take a job
already had a job, and door-to-door recruiting campaigns conducted by
the Civil Service Commission and the War Manpower Commission
yielded negligible results." Marked outflOws from war production cen-
ters began with the Italian surrender and Russian successes,18 and during
1943-45 half the personnel of manufacturing firms were quitting each
year, four times the rates in 1940 and double those afterthe cessation of
hostilities.'9
By spring 1944 the acute phase of labor scarcity had passed. Spot
shortages were made up to some extent by spot measures: special defer-
ments from the draft; emergency campaigns by the Employment Service
for particular plants and industries; Army furloughs for skilled workers;
and special wage boosts allowed by the War Labor Board. The real relief
of the stringency, however, probably came from the debouching of pro-
17TheUnited States at War, p. 433 (Chart 51). Munitions production, which had
been increasing faster than munitions employment, declined from 1944 to mid-1945
at about the same rate as employment.
Ibid.,pp. 42 1-33.
19Bureauof Labor Statistics, Fact Book on Manpower, 195!, p. D-4. The Boeing
Plant in Seattle hired 250,000 in the 3 years after June 1940 but had only 39,000
workers in mid-1943 (The United States at War, p. 432).
22duction pipelines which had been filling during the preceding several
years, not from any canny disposition of manpower. A few contracts
were diverted to surplus labor areas, but on the whole such attempts
were defeated by opposition of Congressmen, business men, and even in-
dustry divisions of the War Production Board (p. 434). In regions such
as the West Coast, programs of the War Manpower Commission to al-
locate tight supply through urgency lists and employment ceilings had
limited success, for the WMC, powerless to enforce priorities or require
employers to hire exclusively through Employment Offices, was regarded
by both industry and the WPB as a mere recruiting agency.
Congress, doubtless reflecting the temper of its constituents, refused
repeatedly to conscript labor. It furthermore exempted farmers from the
draft and backed up Selective Service Boards in deferring for depen-
dency rather than occupation: "The great majority of men over 30
continued for the remainder of the war in the deferred classes —nom-
inally on the basis of occupational essentiality, rather liberally inter-
preted, but actually on the basis of age and family status."
As the end of the European phase came in sight, workers hesitated
more and more to take temporary situations. As it neared, production
schedules were cut and unemployment cropped up here and there.2°
The munitions industries, from which 1.5 million had departed between
late 1943 and early 1945, gave up a million in the last three months be-
fore V-E Day.
In Britain the armed forces took on a few hundred thousand. Employ-
ment held its own in agriculture, transport, and shipping, but gave
ground in the other industries, in defense manufacturing most of all. "It
became apparent that Great Britain had reached the limits of mobiliza-
tion; during the rest of the year recruitment from the nonindustrial pop-
ulation would not be sufficient to offset the normal wastage from
industry. Before long the labour force would decline." The workweek,
up 9 percent since 1938, was also at its limit by mid-1943, especially in
view of the spare hours spent at homeguard exercises and fire watching.2'
The dim prospects led to stricter budgeting of labor as well as in-
20
pp.433, 442-3, 445-9.
91British War Economy, pp. 447, 454. According to my estimates, population 14-64k
which had grown only 300,000 during the preceding 4 years, actually shrank from
mid-1943 to mid-1945. The population of young males and females 14-24 declined
throughout the war under the erosion of birth deficits during the two preceding
decades.
23creased pressure, even "regretful ruthlessness", on females to take es-
sential work or to migrate from surplus labor areas, such as Wales, into
the Midland, Northwestern, and London areas where labor needs were
even more concentrated than population. Most women who could go
elsewhere were already employed. It was necessary to shift them t.o the
tight areas, putting into their jobs those who were tied by child 'and
household cares to their own neighborhoods. Despite the National Serv-
ice Act and in face of moral pressure to get girls and women into war
duties, both essential employment and the labor force fell off; the latter
had dropped perhaps half a million by V-E Day. "Lack of replacements
for ordinary industrial wastage was probably as important as actual
labour withdrawals indecreasing labour force of the less essential indus-
tries."22
Up to May 1944 Germany's combined labor and fighting forces
dwindled slightly, the civilian 'labor force of its own nationals somewhat
more. A few hundred thousand females left industry, transport, and
domestic service, some others took on home work or returned to agri-
culture, but the over-all proportion of its females in work did not change.
Albert Speer, Minister for Armament and War Production, reported to
Hitler in July 1944 that 588,000 able-bodied men 18-34 could be
combed out to the armed forces and replaced by women. His proposal
that 300,000-400,000 domestic servants and 30,000 college girls be
diverted to war production was in vain. Not until the last year of war did
Germany take drastic measures. When Allied successes followed the
landings in France, foreign replacements became a trickle. A real shake-
up was instituted and large sections of industry closed —newspapers,
printing, amusements, railroad travel, teaching, and research., By this
time bombing was disrupting fact9ry routine, paralyzing key industries,
and interfering with mobility, the consequence being that much of the
labor turned loose by austerity measures became unemployed. Between
March 1943 and 1944 average hours worked per week went down half
way to prewar levels in both production and consumption. They declined
for all workers, male and female, skilled and unskilled. From January
1945 on, the war economy was disintegrating.23
The Allies experienced their best victories, the Germans their worst
defeats, in this period, but all three major countries lost manpower from
manufacturing, and fought to some extent with guns and materials put
22Ibid.,p. 460. StrategicBombing Survey, pp. 38-9,215.
24into pipelines in the preceding four years. Only the United States ex-
panded its total labor force.
LABOR FORCE, ARMED FORCES, AND UNEMPLOYMENT
In none of the three countries whose nationals moved into gainful occu-
pations in extra numbers during the war have any such inflows been
recorded in time of peace. In each of the three, as will subsequently
become manifest, the labor force gave up virtually all its wartime gains
as soon as, even before, the armed forces disbanded. Only in the United
States are data adequate to test the association in detail (Charts 1 and 3).
Until the armed forces enlarged, the labor force of this country about
held its own, aside from population increase. Most of the influx occurred
in the years when recruiting camps were jammed with inductees (Chart
3). It does not seem too much, therefore, to suppose that it was brought
about by the military draft. The immense levies drew young men from
schools into the armed forces and therefore into the labor force; reduced
the number at home for whom women had to keep house; took away
the main breadwinner of many families, putting new burdens of earning
upon wives, sisters, and mothers; and, by removing husbands, fiances,
and boyfriends, created a vacuum in the social life of women which
millions filled by taking defense jobs.
It has been this writer's observation that the burden of housekeeping
is determined primarily, by the number for whom beds must be made,
meals cooked, shirts ironed, and food and clothes purchased, and only
secondarily by the size of the house or its equipmentvacuum cleaners,
electric ironers, and automatic dishwashers. If millions of boys and men
were conscripted, fewer houseworkers would be needed and more women
would presumably be available for the labor force. How can this hy-
pothesis be tested statistically?
In 1940 the ratio of the number of females engaged in housework to
the number of persons living in private households of two or more was
0.228, slightly under one houseworker for four persons. Multiplying the
household population by 0.228 yields an estimate of females needed in
housework. Tested against an actual number in Table 3 (lines 3 and 4),
the figure is strikingly close, in' most years within 2 percent (Chart 4).
Not even in the first demobilization years, when women were leaving
jobs to get homes ready for their menfolk, was the excess as much as 5
percent.
25Chart 3
Armed Forces and Labor Force, Annual Increases













The difference between total, active females 14 and older (excluding
the disabled and institutional inmates), and the number of houseworkers
needed, plus the number attending school, is assumed to be available for
the labor force. The actual labor force may of course be smaller, for
there will' always be some women w.ho do not wish or feel competent to
earn a living. Nevertheless, during World War lithe number in the
labor force fluctuated with thenumber available (Table 4, lines 4 and
5, and Chart 5). Aside from population growth and the decline of girls
attending school, it seems possible to attribute nearly all the increase in








1941—42 1942—43 1943—44 1944- 45for female houseworkers as a result of millions of men being drained out
of private homes to the armed forces. The relation after the war is less
impressive. During 1946-47 women quit jobs more rapidly than men
left the armed forces and in larger number than were required to keep
house for the returning servicemen. Undoubtedly this excessive outflow
from the labor force was .a reaction to the years of work and separation.
During 1948-5 1, on the other hand, females increased more rapidly in
the labor force than in the number available, until in April 1950 and
1951 the gap was nearly closed and barely more than half a million
females were unaccounted for.
But the association with the armed forces was: apparently not inde-
pendent of changes in unemployment. The United States had only partly
recovered from the great depression of the 1930's when Hitler's divisions
broke through into the Low Countries. Over 7 percent of its work force
were still seeking jobs 19 months later when the Japanese dropped their
bombs on Hawaii. Although my studies elsewhere have shown that the
peacetime labor force has borne a stable ratio to the working age popu-
lation from one high employment period to another, they have shown
also that it shrinks a bit when jobs become hard to find, then expands
again when employment recovers and people with new hope rejoin the
labor market.24 The labor force of this country has been close to 56 per-
cent of the population 14 and older in years of peace and high employ-
ment such as 1947 or 1930 (1930data adjusted to the 1945 measure-
ment technique). In April 190, however, it was only 54.1 percent,
hence 1.8 percent too low. The deficiency may have been due to the
fact that since one in six persons already in the job market could not get
work 1.8 million, persons may have been discouraged from even seeking
it, remaining out of the labor force altogether.
Certainly, the ratio to armed force increases was high in years such
as 1940-43 when unemployment was falling most rapidly, highest of
all (1.. 19) in 1941-42 when 3½ million idle persons were being absorbed
into jobs, and relatively low, close to 0.50, in the last two years when
few unemployed were kft to be absorbed (Chart 6).
"C. D. Long, The Labor Force in Wartime America, NBER Occasional Paper 14,
March 1944; 'The Labor Force and Economic Change', Chapter 13, Insights into
Labor Issues, ed. by R. A. Lester and Joseph Shister (Macmillan, 1948); 'Labor














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Females Needed in Housework BasedonPopulation to be Caredfor
United States, April 1940—1951














Tobe sure, the rise in the armed forces was doubtless partly respon-
sible for reducing unemployment in the early years of World War II.
Many idle persons were absorbed directly into the military, many others
into tank arsenals and electronic assembly lines, to supply the armies
that were in the making. Thus unemployment may not have been an
independent factor. But independent or not, it was a factor and it would
not be safe to ignore the effect that reemployment of 8 million had on
the size and rapidity of the labor force increase. Suppose that at the
outbreak of World War lithe United States had had only 4, instead of
15, percent unemployed and that its labor force' had been at the same
proportion of the population as ordiflarily prevails in years of peace and
29
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Female Labor Force and Number Available
United States, April 1940—1951





highemployment. Could the labor have been expected to rise as
fast as it did in those early war years? We shall have an opportunity to
test this in the Korean War, for when the Communist equipped bat-
talions swept across the 38th parallel, unemployment in the United
States wasnomore than a third of its pre-Worid War II level and its
labor force was 3 million larger than 111940proportionshad prevailed.
It will be interestIng to see whether the labor force increases bear as high
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Ratio of Labor Force to Armed Force Increases
and Annual Decreases in Unemployment















4THE WAR PEAK: UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, CANADA,
GERMANY
In World War I the United States, Great Britain, andGermanydid not
add appreciably to their labor forces, the illusion of an over-all increase
having arisen from transfers out of domestic service and other paid em-
ployment to factories and shipyards.25 In all three countries the civilian
labor force was depleted by the full number drafted, and labor needed
in war work had to be pulled from the small pooi of prewar unemployed
or from industries turning out goods of less urgency.
During World War II, on the contrary, the labor forces unquestion-
ably increased (Chart 7), though the number varied widely among the
countries. Nonexistent in Germany unless one counts foreigners, and
Paper 14, pp. 39 if.
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Source: Table 2.